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ACROSS THE BORDER AND BACK AGAIN:  




The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction is a multilateral international treaty designed to effectively 
govern the return of children abducted (often by a parent) and taken to a 
foreign country.  In most cases, if the “left-behind” parent applies for relief 
under the Convention within a year of the abduction, the child must be 
returned to the country of origin for a custody hearing.  If, however, the 
application for return is made more than one year after abduction and the 
child is now “well-settled” in their new environment, the application may 
be denied under the well-settled affirmative defense provided by Article 12 
of the Convention.  The Convention does not, however, specify which 
factors are to be considered in a well-settled determination, and courts 
have frequently grappled with how immigration status (particularly, 
whether the abducting parent and child are living in the new country 
illegally) should impact the determination.  U.S. and international courts 
have adopted one of three approaches to the issue:  granting immigration 
status considerable weight in the determination, treating immigration status 
as one of a number of equally weighted factors in the determination, or 
granting immigration status considerably little weight in the determination.  
This Note addresses this conflict and concludes that courts should generally 
accord immigration status little weight, except where uncertain 
immigration status is likely to affect the child’s future prospects, 
irrespective of a deportation risk. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez and Manuel Jose Lozano, both 
British citizens originally from Colombia, met in London and began 
dating.1  Though they never married, Diana eventually gave birth to a baby 
girl on October 21, 2005.2  Shortly thereafter, things took a turn for the 
worse.  Diana claimed that Manuel had frequently abused her, calling her 
names and attempting to rape her.3  Their child, exposed to these domestic 
disputes, developed a host of problems, including frequent and spontaneous 
fits of crying, nightmares, and bed-wetting.4  Nonetheless, Manuel 
submitted that the three maintained a relatively normal family life.5 
On November 19, 2008, Diana and her daughter set out for nursery 
school but never returned.6  Instead, they hid out at a women’s shelter for 
nearly seven months before arranging for a clandestine trip across the 
Atlantic Ocean.7  In New York City, the two rendezvoused with Diana’s 
sister, a U.S. citizen with a family of her own.8  Finally, Diana and her 
daughter were safe from her husband. 
Manuel, however, had other ideas.  Still believing his family could 
reconcile their differences, he pursued every available means to locate his 
 
 1. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 2. Id. at 45–46. 
 3. Id. at 45. 
 4. Id. at 46. 
 5. Id. at 45. 
 6. Id. at 46. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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daughter in the United Kingdom before learning that she was now living in 
New York.9  Desperate to reunite with her, he filed a petition for the child’s 
return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction (the Convention).10  Manuel claims that the child should 
be returned to the United Kingdom.11  Diana claims the child now has an 
established life in New York.12  The battle lines are drawn, but which party 
should prevail?  Should the fact that Diana and her daughter are living in 
New York illegally impact the court’s decision?  This Note will attempt to 
answer this difficult question. 
As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “It is never an easy nor a joyous task to 
resolve a dispute between parents that may determine the custody of their 
child; nor is the outcome ever fully satisfactory.  Frequently, both sides 
offer appealing, indeed compelling, arguments.  Yet, both cannot 
prevail.”13  Custody battles are inherently emotionally charged disputes, 
and they are made all the more complex when they cross international lines.  
Indeed, situations such as the one described above are not uncommon and 
have far-reaching, significant effects. The court’s determination of whether 
the child may retain residence in a new country is far more complex than a 
common domestic custody dispute.  The situation becomes even more 
muddled when, as is frequently the case, the fleeing parent and child are in 
the new country illegally. 
Fortunately, over eighty nations (including the United States) have 
implemented a treaty intended to provide a framework for remedying these 
difficult scenarios.14  The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction is an international treaty with the goal of 
“protect[ing] children from the harmful effects of abduction and retention 
across international boundaries by providing a procedure to bring about 
their prompt return.”15  Convened in 1980 at The Hague, the Convention 
deals exclusively with unilateral, wrongful removal of children by parents, 
guardians, or close family members.16  The issue of international child 
abduction is significant.  In the one-year period between October 1, 2006, 
 
 9. Id. at 47. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 47–48. 
 12. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 13. In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 14. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) [hereinafter 
Status Table].  These eighty nations include both Convention members and nonmembers. Id. 
 15. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, Child Abduction Section, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=21 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 16. PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 1, 4 (1999). 
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and September 30, 2007, 355 applications for the return of 518 children 
were submitted to the U.S. Central Authority alone.17 
Though the Convention aims to provide for the swift return of abducted 
children, it does grant a number of affirmative defenses that may be 
asserted by the abducting parent to counter the return application.  One such 
affirmative defense is Article 12, the “well-settled” defense.18  Article 12 
states that a child shall be returned to the petitioning parent if the petition is 
filed within a year of the child’s abduction.19  If, however, the abducting 
parent can establish that the petitioning parent has applied for relief under 
the Convention more than a year after abduction and the child is now well-
settled in their new environment, the child may be allowed to remain in the 
new country.20  The Convention does not, however, specify how this well-
settled determination is to be made or what factors may be considered.21  
Additionally, the Convention offers no guidance on how immigration status 
should be treated in the well-settled determination.22 
Both U.S. and international courts have adopted a variety of approaches 
in determining the proper weight to be accorded to immigration status in the 
well-settled determination.  Some courts have granted immigration status 
considerable weight in finding the child not to be well-settled, holding that 
uncertain immigration status significantly undermines an otherwise well-
settled finding.23  Other courts have considered it as one of a number of 
equally weighted factors.24  Further, some courts have accorded 
immigration status significantly less weight, finding the child to be settled 
despite an uncertain immigration status.25  This conflict also implicates a 
broader issue:  Should courts take the child’s future prospects into account 
in making the well-settled determination?26  This Note will examine these 
two issues. 
 
 17. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 5 (April 2008), available at 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/2008HagueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf.  Each 
signatory is required to designate a Central Authority “to discharge the duties which are 
imposed by the Convention.” Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction art. 6, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 18. Hague Convention, supra note 17, art. 12. 
 19. Id. (“Where . . . a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the 
wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child 
forthwith.”). 
 20. Id. (“The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been 
commenced after the expiration of the period of one year . . . shall also order the return of the 
child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.”). 
 21. See, e.g., In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 1001–02. 
 23. See, e.g., In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 24. See, e.g., Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281–82 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
 25. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 26. For example, some courts have rejected a “well-settled” finding on the basis that 
immigration status significantly limits a child’s future prospects. See, e.g., A. v. M. (2002), 
209 N.S.R. 2d 248, paras. 85–87 (Can. N.S. C.A.).  Other courts have held that the 
determination should only consider the child’s current situation and should not entail 
speculation about the child’s future. See, e.g., Dir.-Gen., Dep’t of Cmty. Servs. v M (1998) 
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Part I of this Note provides the context for this discussion.  Specifically, 
it considers the background of the Convention, U.S. implementation of the 
Convention, the procedure for the child’s return, and jurisdictional issues.  
Part I also discusses a typical Convention case, the specifics of Article 12, 
considerations regarding the timing of the well-settled determination, the 
standard of review and treaty interpretation process, and relevant U.S. 
immigration classifications.  Part II discusses the various approaches courts 
have taken in considering immigration status as a factor in the well-settled 
determination.  Part II specifically considers three different ways courts 
have considered the issue:  as a significant factor, as an equally weighted 
factor, and as a relatively insignificant factor.  Part II also discusses how 
this conflict interacts with the broader question of whether (and to what 
degree) the determination should take a child’s future prospects into 
account.  Part III proposes that the U.S. Supreme Court consider the issue 
and promulgate a bright-line rule that immigration status should, by default, 
be accorded relatively minimal weight in the determination.  It also argues, 
however, that courts should consider a child’s likely future prospects in 
both their country of origin and country of current residence on a case-by-
case basis. 
I.  THE CONVENTION, ARTICLE 12, AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES 
Part I.A provides background information on the Convention, while Part 
I.B addresses U.S. implementation of the Convention. Part I.C highlights 
the standard procedure for the return of an abducted child, Part I.D 
discusses a host of jurisdictional issues associated with the Convention 
process, and Part I.E provides an example of a typical Convention case.  
Part I.F surveys Article 12 in detail, while Part I.G considers various issues 
surrounding the timing of the well-settled determination.  Part I.H addresses 
the standard of review embraced in Convention cases and how the treaty 
interpretation process is generally conducted.  Lastly, Part I.I notes various 
U.S. immigration classifications relevant to Article 12 cases. 
A.  Hague Convention Background 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction is an international treaty signed at The Hague on October 25, 
1980.27  The Convention was specifically crafted to respond to the growing 
problem of international child abductions—spurred by increased global 
mobility, sociolegal and technical developments, and breakdowns in the 
 
24 Fam LR 178 ¶ 91 (Austl.).  Still, other courts have found that immigration status will 
have a minimal impact on a child’s future prospects in finding the child to be well-settled. 
See, e.g., B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013. 
 27. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 16, at 23. 
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traditional family structure.28  Prior to its signing, the recovery of an 
abducted child was exceedingly difficult.29 
Hague Conventions each follow a relatively similar pattern.  Once a topic 
is chosen, the first step is to investigate the issue and determine if there 
exists a collective will to address it.30  The topic is then formally adopted by 
the Conference in Plenary Session, and the Permanent Bureau conducts 
further research.31  Once these steps are complete, the negotiation and 
drafting process can begin.32 
The origins of the Convention at issue in this Note can be traced to a 
meeting of the Special Commission of Miscellaneous Matters in January 
1976.33  At that meeting, a Canadian delegate suggested that the topic of 
“legal kidnapping” be added to the agenda.34  In the years that followed, the 
Permanent Bureau began to research the subject, an inquiry that considered 
both the legal and sociological aspects of the issue.35  Initially, the findings 
of the report generated little support for an international tribunal on the 
issue; there was, however, a call for increased international cooperation.36  
A Special Commission was convened to iron out the details of the first 
Convention draft, and eventually the draft was presented to Convention 
members for comments.37  In the days that followed, the affirmative 
defenses against automatic return of the child—one of which was Article 
12—generated the most intense debate.38  Eventually, however, a 
compromise was reached, and the first four signatories—Canada, France, 
Greece, and Switzerland—signed the Convention on October 25, 1980.39 
The Convention has since been implemented by over eighty signatories, 
including the United States.40  Though the drafters of the Convention 
originally intended to provide protection for mothers from abusive, child-
abducting fathers, the vast majority of Convention cases to date have 
actually involved mothers who have abducted their children.41 
 
 28. Id. at 2.  
 29. See id. at 3.  Prior to the Convention, the process for locating and returning the child 
was exceedingly complicated and inefficient.  First, the child needed to be located.  The 
court then would often engage in a lengthy proceeding—usually treating the abduction as a 
“legal kidnapping”—before ultimately determining whether return was warranted. See id. 
 30. See id. at 16. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 16–17. 
 34. Id. at 17. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 18. 
 37. Id. at 18–19. 
 38. Id. at 19. 
 39. Id. at 23. 
 40. Status Table, supra note 14.  The United States has implemented the Convention 
through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 
(2006). 
 41. See Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic 
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 609–10 (2000).  Indeed, a 2003 report found that 68 
percent of abducting parents were mothers. See Nigel Lowe, A Statistical Analysis of 
Applications Made in 2003 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
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The primary objective of the Convention is to “protect children 
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or 
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the 
State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of 
access.”42  The Convention specifically aims to restore the preabduction 
status quo and to deter parents from crossing international borders in the 
hope of securing a more sympathetic custody-dispute forum.43  Indeed, the 
Perez-Vera report, an explanatory report accompanying the Convention, 
explains that the Convention aims to achieve deterrence by reestablishing 
the status quo, and allowing the court of habitual residence to make a 
custody determination.44  The Convention’s focus is ultimately whether the 
child “should be returned to a country for custody proceedings and not what 
the outcome of those proceedings should be.”45 
B.  U.S. Implementation of the Convention 
The United States implemented the Convention through the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).46  Ratified in 1988,47 ICARA 
codifies the Convention’s various articles, “establish[ing] legal rights and 
procedures for the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully 
removed or retained.”48  ICARA lays out the prima facie case for wrongful 
retention.  In order to secure return of the child, the “left-behind” parent 
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the habitual 
residence49 of the child immediately before the date of the alleged wrongful 
retention was indeed in a foreign country; (2) the retention is in breach of 
custody rights under the original country’s law; and (3) the petitioner was 
exercising custody rights at the time of the alleged wrongful retention.50  If 
the petitioner can satisfy this burden, and has made his application within 
one year from the child’s abduction, the child must be returned unless an 
affirmative defense can be established.51 
 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, HCCH, 21–22 (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_pd03e1_2007.pdf. 
 42. Hague Convention, supra note 17, pmbl. 
 43. In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Lops v. 
Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 936 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 44. See Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention, HCCH, 429 (1982), http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf. 
 45. Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 11601(a); see also Edoho v. Edoho, No. H-10-1881, 2010 WL 3257480, at *4 
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010). 
 49. “Habitual residence” has been defined as the “place where [the child] has been 
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a 
degree of settled purpose from the child’s perspective.” In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 1303, 1310–11 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d 
Cir. 1995)). 
 50. See id. at 1310. 
 51. See id. at 1312. 
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C.  Procedure for the Return of the Child 
The Convention process for securing the return of a child can be a 
lengthy and intimidating endeavor, especially for a petitioner with a limited 
grasp of English.52  Once an application has been completed, it is typically 
submitted to the Central Authority of the country of the child’s habitual 
residence.53  The application is then transmitted to the Central Authority of 
the country where the applicant believes the child now lives.54  In the 
United States, the application is then passed on to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which investigates the child’s 
whereabouts and transmits the application to the relevant state attorney 
general.55  The petitioner may then file his petition in either state court or 
the federal district court in the state where the child is currently living.56 
D.  Jurisdictional Issues 
Under ICARA, both U.S. district and state courts are granted concurrent 
original jurisdiction over petitions filed under the Convention.57  As a 
result, judges with a wide range of experience and expertise hear 
Convention cases.58  State and federal courts are theoretically supposed to 
apply and interpret the Convention in the same way.  Federal courts, 
however, are generally more likely to interpret the Convention 
appropriately but are often considered slower avenues of resolution.59  In 
contrast, state courts may be more efficient in resolving family law and 
custody issues but often misconstrue the Convention’s mandate by 
considering the underlying merits of the custody action, rather than 
returning the child to the country of habitual residence (in the event that the 
well-settled defense proves unsuccessful) for a custody determination.60 
 
 52. See, e.g., In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009).  For example, in 
B. Del C.S.B, the father petitioning for the return of his daughter to Mexico made numerous 
trips to the Mexican Minors Protection Department, met with the Mexican State Department, 
and eventually submitted an application under the Convention. Id.  He was forced to wait 
nearly seven months, however, while the application was translated into English. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., id. 
 54. See, e.g., id. 
 55. See, e.g., id. 
 56. See ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006) (“The courts of the States and the United 
States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under the 
Convention.”); see also B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1006–07. 
 57. In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 58. Catherine Norris, Comment, Immigration and Abduction:  The Relevance of U.S. 
Immigration Status to Defenses Under the Hague Convention on International Child 
Abduction, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 167 n.58 (2010). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
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E.  A Typical Hague Convention Case 
Some scholars have noted that “[a]bductions occur for a variety of 
reasons from the narcissistic to the heroic.”61  Though they necessarily 
vary, the vast majority of Convention cases involve mothers and children 
fleeing due to domestic violence and the inability of their home country to 
protect them.62  Other common reasons for abductions include the desire to 
exact some sort of revenge on the left-behind parent, the desire to protect 
the child from harm, and the desire of one parent to return to their country 
of origin.63 
The most common destination is the United States.64  Indeed, the United 
States receives more petitions for the return of children than any other 
signatory to the Convention.65  Since the late 1970s, the State Department 
estimates that the United States has received inquiries for over 16,000 cases 
of international child abduction.66 
F.  Article 12:  The Well-Settled Defense 
The Convention provides a number of affirmative defenses that may be 
asserted by the abducting parent to prevent the return of the child to the 
country of origin.67  One such defense is established in Article 12—the 
well-settled defense.68  Article 12 specifically states that “[t]he judicial or 
administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been 
commenced after the expiration of the period of one year . . . shall also 
order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now 
settled in its new environment.”69  The defense is based on the rationale that 
when a child has become settled and adjusted to a new environment, a 
 
 61. Geoffrey L. Greif & Rebecca L. Hegar, International Parental Abduction and Its 
Implications for Social Work Practice:  Great Britain to the United States, 7 CHILD. & SOC’Y 
269, 270 (1993). 
 62. Norris, supra note 58, at 160. 
 63. See Greif & Hegar, supra note 61, at 270. 
 64. Lowe, supra note 41, at 33. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Sudha Shetty & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Adult Domestic Violence in Cases of 
International Parental Child Abduction, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 115, 118 (2005). 
 67. See In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004).  Courts 
have been directed to construe these defenses narrowly. Id. 
 68. Other affirmative defenses that may be raised include (1) the parent seeking return of 
the child consented to the child’s removal or retention, (2) the return of the child is not 
permitted under fundamental principles of human rights, and (3) returning the child would 
place the child at “grave risk” of harm. See id.  Despite the existence of these affirmative 
defenses, however, courts retain ultimate discretion in determining whether a child should be 
returned to their country of habitual residence. See Hague Convention, supra note 17, art. 18.  
Article 18 of the Convention states that the defenses “do not limit the power of a judicial or 
administrative authority to order the return of the child at any time.” Id.  Thus, courts retain 
ultimate discretion in ordering the return of a child, despite the existence of an affirmative 
defense, if return would further the aims of the Convention. See Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1310. 
 69. Hague Convention, supra note 17, art. 12. 
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forced return might only serve to cause the child further distress, 
accentuating the harm caused by the initial relocation.70 
The Convention declined, however, to provide any specification as to 
what constitutes well-settled, and courts have, in response, taken a variety 
of approaches in interpreting the defense.  It is largely agreed that the 
definition should reflect the Convention’s intention of providing a swift 
return of the child if possible, and to have custody matters decided in the 
sovereign with the strongest interest in the child’s care and protection.71  At 
least one court has viewed the definition as a two-pronged analysis 
involving (1) the physical element of being established in a new community 
and (2) an emotional and psychological element projecting stability into the 
future.72  The U.S. State Department has declared that a “settled” finding is 
appropriate where “nothing less than substantial evidence of the child’s 
significant connections to the new country is intended to suffice to meet the 
respondent’s burden of proof.”73  Courts have agreed, however, that this 
burden must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.74 
The list of factors frequently considered is a long one, and each case 
dictates that different issues be addressed in the well-settled analysis.  
Generally, however, courts commonly consider the age of the child, the 
stability of the new residence, whether the child attends school or day care 
consistently, whether the child attends a religious institution regularly, the 
stability of the abducting parent’s employment, and whether the child has 
friends and relatives in the area.75  Courts will also less frequently consider 
the child’s living environment, the involvement of the child’s parents, any 
active measures taken to conceal the child’s whereabouts,76 and the 
possibility of prosecution for concealing the child.77  Questions of 
immigration status do not often arise in a court’s adjudication of the case-
in-chief, often because most judges find it irrelevant to the question of 
whether a wrongful removal occurred.78  Courts have found immigration 
 
 70. In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 71. See In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); see also In re Robinson, 
983 F. Supp. 1339, 1344–45 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 72. C (a Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229, [46] (Eng.). 
 73. Text & Legal Analysis of Hague International Child Abduction Convention, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
 74. In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
 75. Id. at 1314; Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (S.D. Ohio 2002); see also 
Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 421 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 76. Concealment of the child is a frequent occurrence and has provided no shortage of 
trouble for courts interpreting Article 12.  Specifically, this issue has given rise to another 
hotly contested and timely debate that is ultimately beyond the scope of this Note:  May the 
one year period for return of the child be tolled where the child’s whereabouts have been 
concealed by the abducting parent?  Both domestic and international courts have interpreted 
the tolling issue differently, and it frequently accompanies the immigration status debate that 
this Note addresses.  For a detailed discussion of the tolling issue, see Merle H. Weiner, 
Uprooting Children in the Name of Equity, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 409 (2010). 
 77. Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. 
 78. Norris, supra note 58, at 169. 
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status relevant, however, in determining if the “grave-risk”79 and well-
settled defenses apply.80  Thus, immigration status, when relevant, is 
considered in the well-settled determination as well. 
G.  Timing of Article 12 Well-Settled Determinations and 
Consideration of Future Prospects 
In considering how the well-settled determination should be made, courts 
have taken a variety of approaches concerning the timing of the 
determination and whether the determination should ultimately consider the 
child’s likely future prospects in the new country.  How courts approach 
this issue significantly affects whether, and to what degree, the court 
considers immigration status to be a relevant factor.  Some courts have held 
that “[t]he test, and the only test to be applied, is whether the children have 
settled in their new environment.  That test is to be applied either at the time 
of the application being made or at the time of trial.”81  Advocates of such 
an approach point to the Convention’s focus on the present, and contend 
that the Convention does not have an interest in determining the best 
interests of the child in the long term.82  In such instances, the 
determination of future well-being is better suited for the court conducting 
the ultimate custody proceeding.83 
Many courts have adopted the opposite approach, holding instead that the 
well-settled determination should consider a child’s future prospects.84  
Courts in favor of such an approach often weigh whether there appears to 
be an immediate threat of deportation,85 and whether, on a case-by-case 
basis, children will be able to take full advantage of opportunities available 
to them.86  Indeed, this approach cuts both ways.  In some instances, courts 
may find the lack of opportunities for undocumented immigrants to be a 
significant factor in the consideration of how immigration status affects the 
well-settled determination.87  In others, courts have found that the 
 
 79. See supra note 68. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Dir.-Gen., Dep’t of Cmty. Servs. v M, (1998) 24 Fam LR 178 ¶ 91 (Austl.).  
 82. In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Convention . . . is 
concerned with the present, and not with determining the best interests of the child in the 
long term.”); see also Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 4259 (PKC), 2007 WL 2600862, at 
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (noting that Article 12 does not invite courts to decide “which 
country offers a more comfortable material existence”). 
 83. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013. 
 84. See, e.g., (A Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229, 2 Fam. 797 [55]–[57] (Eng.) 
(stating that new residence must “be as permanent as anything in life could be said to be 
permanent”). 
 85. See, e.g., id. 
 86. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 87. See, e.g., A. v. M. (2002), 209 N.S.R. 2d 248, paras. 85–87 (Can. N.S. C.A.) (finding 
that a mother’s uncertain immigration status and potential inability to work were relevant to 
the “well-settled” determination). 
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protections afforded to undocumented immigrants weigh in favor of a 
finding that the child is well-settled.88 
H.  Standard of Review/Treaty Interpretation Process 
The process by which courts engage in treaty interpretation is essential to 
the court’s ultimate determination of whether, and to what degree, 
immigration status should be considered in an Article 12 analysis.  Courts 
often begin the treaty interpretation process by considering the text of the 
treaty and the context in which it is used.89  The clear meaning of the treaty 
language controls, unless that interpretation is inconsistent with the 
intentions of the drafters.90  Courts may employ rules of statutory 
construction in interpreting ambiguous passages but may also consider the 
history of the treaty and the way various signatories have interpreted a 
particular provision.91 
Likewise, the standard of review embraced by appellate courts engaging 
in an Article 12 analysis plays a key role in how courts consider the various 
inquiries associated with a well-settled analysis.  Indeed, there is some 
confusion over the standard of review to be applied in interpreting Article 
12.  Generally, courts have held that the factual findings underlying an 
Article 12 determination are reviewed for clear error, but the ultimate legal 
conclusion of whether a child is settled or not is reviewed de novo.92  
Factual findings that are reviewed for clear error include whether the factors 
often considered in the well-settled determination are present in a particular 
case.93  Whether these various factors are relevant to determining if the 
child is well-settled, however, is subject to de novo review.94  For example, 
whether a child and mother are living in a country illegally is reviewed for 
clear error, but whether this factor is considered in finding the child to be 
well-settled or not is reviewed de novo.95  This second issue—whether, and 
to what degree, immigration status should be considered in the 
determination—is the main focus of this Note. 
I.  Immigration Classifications 
The distinction between immigration classifications is inherently relevant 
to the determination of whether a parent or child is living in the United 
States illegally.  Three broad categories of immigration classifications exist.  
The first is permanent resident aliens, commonly referred to as 
 
 88. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013.  Such protections include the right to public 
education irrespective of immigration status, as well as a variety of public services available 
to undocumented immigrants including emergency Medicaid, school breakfast and lunch 
programs, and access to state nutritional programs. Id. 
 89. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 50.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1008; see also Lozano, 697 F.3d at 49–50. 
 93. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1008. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 1009–10; see also Lozano, 697 F.3d at 49–50. 
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immigrants.96  These residents have been admitted to the United States as 
lawful permanent residents.97  The second class, temporary residents (or 
nonimmigrants), consists of aliens admitted to the United States for a 
specific purpose, such as diplomats or students.98  The last relevant class, 
commonly referred to as “EWIs” (entered without inspection) or 
undocumented workers, is made up of undocumented aliens living within 
the United States.99  Most of the parties in Convention cases fall into this 
third category.100 
II.  THE IMMIGRATION STATUS DEBATE:  THREE APPROACHES 
“To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States 
unlawfully . . . children are subject to deportation.  But there is no 
assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported.  An 
illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in 
this country, or even to become a citizen.  In light of the discretionary 
federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically 
determine that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported 
. . . .”101 
This uncertainty lies at the heart of the debate addressed by this Note.  
Indeed, the weight to be accorded to immigration status in the well-settled 
determination is significantly impacted by the likelihood that the child will 
be deported (among other factors).102  Although courts have consistently 
found immigration status to be a factor in the well-settled determination to 
date, no court has held it to be singularly dispositive.103  Further, while 
district courts have often taken a child’s immigration status into account 
when deciding if the child is well-settled, until recently, only one federal 
appellate court—the Ninth Circuit—had directly addressed “whether a court 
may find that a child is not ‘settled’ for the purposes of Article 12 of the 
 
 96. See Glossary of Terms, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=5bb767ee5cb38210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=5bb767ee5cb
38210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id.  Other common examples of temporary residents include foreign government 
officials, visitors for business or pleasure, aliens in transit through the U.S., international 
representatives, temporary workers and trainees, representatives of foreign media, exchange 
visitors, immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, intracompany transferees, NATO officials, and 
religious workers. Id. 
 99. See Guevara v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2011) (defining an 
undocumented alien as one who “entered without inspection”).  
 100. See, e.g., B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1004; In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 101. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (citations omitted). 
 102. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012).  Other factors that are likely to 
impact the importance of the child’s immigration status are the likelihood that the child will 
be able to obtain legal status, the child’s age, and the extent to which the child may be 
harmed by an inability to receive certain benefits. Id. 
 103. See id. at 57. 
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Hague Convention for the reason that she does not have lawful immigration 
status.”104 
This part addresses the various approaches courts have taken in 
determining whether, and to what degree, immigration status should impact 
a finding that a child is well-settled.  Specifically, Part II discusses the three 
prevailing ways district, appellate, and international courts have interpreted 
the immigration status issue as it relates to the well-settled determination:  
as a significant, as equally weighted, and as relatively insignificant. 
A.  Immigration Status As a Heavily Weighted Factor 
The first cases addressed in this part have held immigration status to be a 
significant factor in the well-settled determination, often undermining a 
child’s otherwise settled status.  In re Ahumada Cabrera,105 decided by the 
Southern District of Florida, is one such case.  The respondent, Lozano, fled 
with her child from her home in Argentina to Florida.106  Upon her arrival, 
she told immigration officials that she and the child were simply visiting as 
tourists.107  Not long after, however, the mother obtained illegal 
employment in the United States and registered her child in a Florida 
school.108  The petitioner, the child’s father, eventually learned that Lozano 
and the child were living with Lozano’s sister in Florida, and initiated 
Convention proceedings.109  In response, Lozano asserted that the child was 
now settled in Florida.110 
The court found that despite the existence of numerous factors indicating 
that the mother and child had established significant ties to their new 
environment—including that the child attended school regularly, had good 
grades, and participated in extracurricular activities—the mother’s uncertain 
immigration status undermined a finding that the child was now “well-
settled.”111  The court granted significant weight to a comparative 
consideration of the child’s future prospects in both Florida and Argentina.  
The court noted that the mother lacked long-term job stability in Florida, 
 
 104. B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1001–02. 
 105. 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
 106. Id. at 1308.  The Lozano in Ahumada Cabrera bears no apparent relation to the 
Lozano in Lozano v. Alvarez. 
 107. Id. at 1309. 
 108. Id. at 1308. 
 109. Id. at 1309. 
 110. Id. at 1312. 
 111. Id. at 1314 (holding that “any stability [the child] may enjoy in the United States is 
significantly undermined by the Respondent’s uncertain immigration status”).  It is also 
worth noting (though it is ultimately beyond the scope of this Note), that the court 
additionally found that equitable tolling should apply in this scenario. Id. at 1313.  The court 
held that, despite the fact that the father had filed his petition more than a year after the 
abduction, his petition was still timely (essentially rendering any application of the Article 
12 defense moot). Id.  The court thus found that the child’s return was warranted both under 
the standard provisions of the Convention mandating return if the petition is filed within one 
year of abduction, and because the well-settled defense was undermined by the mother’s 
immigration status. Id. at 1314–15. 
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and that the child faced no threat of deportation in her native country.112  
Therefore, the court held that “it is better for the child to return to Argentina 
now than for her to be deported at a later date when she has become firmly 
settled in the United States.”113 
The Eastern District of New York came to a similar conclusion in In re 
Koc.114  In Koc, both the mother and father, though Polish, had resided in 
Greece with their young child.115  The mother obtained a six-month visa, 
and told the father she was taking the child to the United States to visit the 
child’s grandparents; however, she never returned.116  Both mother and 
child eventually established significant ties to their new country:  the child 
obtained medical insurance in the United States and received regular 
medical and dental care, a number of the mother’s family members lived in 
the neighboring area, and the mother had steady employment as a piano 
teacher.117  An associate of the mother even testified that she would be 
willing to sponsor the mother for a visa if the mother and child were 
threatened with deportation.118 
Despite the existence of these factors, however, the court found that the 
child was not settled in her new environment due to the uncertain 
immigration status of both the mother and child.119  The court noted that 
“[t]he fact that the Immigration Service may not be looking to deport [the 
mother and child] at this time does not, in any way, guarantee that that 
position will not change in the future . . . .”120  Even though other members 
of the mother’s family were legal citizens, and a friend was willing to 
sponsor the mother, the court found that this did not significantly alter the 
uncertainty of the child’s future prospects.121 
The Middle District of Florida has adopted a similar view.  In Lopez v. 
Alcala,122 the court found immigration status to be a significant factor 
undermining the well-settled determination.123  Lopez involved a mother 
who fled with two of her children from Mexico to Texas, leaving the father 
and another child behind.124  Though they entered the country illegally, the 
mother was able to secure employment at a dry cleaner and enroll her 
 
 112. Id. at 1314.  
 113. Id. 
 114. 181 F. Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 115. Id. at 140. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 143–44, 153–54. 
 118. Id. at 144. 
 119. Id. at 154.  The court held that immigration status was one of a number of factors 
weighing against a finding that the child was settled. Id.  Specifically, the court noted that 
the child had moved often since arriving in the United States and had developed few friends. 
Id.  Further, the mother had been unable to establish lasting and significant employment. Id. 
 120. Id.  The child’s father had actually been denied a visa to visit his wife and daughter 
in the United States because of their uncertain immigration status. Id. 
 121. Id. at 154 n.20. 
 122. 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 123. Id. at 1260. 
 124. Id. at 1256–57. 
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children in public school.125  Despite their EWI status, the mother and 
children applied for petitions seeking asylum in the United States.126 
In finding that the children were not well-settled in their new 
environment, the court considered a number of factors, including 
immigration status.127  The court stated that a vast number of factors 
weighed in favor of finding that the children were settled:  the children had 
adjusted well to school, made a number of friends, and learned English.128  
Yet, the court found that because the mother and children were illegal 
aliens, they were subject to deportation at any time, and therefore could 
never truly be settled in the United States.129  Additionally, the court held 
that their applications for asylum status were irrelevant to the determination 
because they had not yet been approved and appeared to lack merit.130 
International courts have also addressed this inquiry, and have, in some 
instances, adopted a similar approach to that embraced by the U.S. district 
courts discussed above.  A. v. M.,131 a case decided by the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeals, concerned an American mother and child who fled to 
Canada.132  The mother and father were both American citizens and 
residents of Iowa.133  They eventually divorced amid allegations of child 
abuse; however, these allegations ultimately proved to be unfounded, and 
the father was granted visitation rights with the child.134  The mother, in an 
attempt to subvert the court’s grant of visitation rights, fled with the child to 
Canada.135  The mother remarried and subsequently separated from a 
Canadian man,136 and eventually settled with the child in a small town in 
Nova Scotia.137  Meanwhile, a U.S. judge ordered the return of both mother 
and child to Iowa.138 
In determining whether the child was well-settled in Nova Scotia, the 
court considered the significant connections established by the child in her 
community and the duration of her residence there.139  The court noted, 
however, that the child still had significant ties to Iowa—specifically, the 
father’s family lived in Iowa and the various professionals involved in the 
abuse allegations and custody proceedings were residents of Iowa.140  The 
court ultimately held that ordering the child’s return would further the 
 
 125. Id. at 1257. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1260. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1260 n.6. 
 131. (2002), 209 N.S.R. 2d 248 (Can. N.S. C.A.). 
 132. Id. para. 1. 
 133. Id. para. 3. 
 134. Id. paras. 3–7. 
 135. Id. paras. 9–10. 
 136. Id. paras. 11–13. 
 137. Id. para. 14. 
 138. Id. para. 19. 
 139. See id. para. 79. 
 140. Id. para. 79. 
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deterrent purpose of the Convention by preventing the mother from 
subverting an Iowa court ruling.141  The court placed significant weight on 
the child’s future stability, specifically noting that since the mother and 
child were living in Canada illegally, their ability to remain there was, at 
best, uncertain.142  Further, the mother’s uncertain immigration status was a 
significant barrier to her ability to secure long-term employment.143  
Therefore, the court held that the child was required to return to Iowa.144 
Canadian courts are not the only foreign jurisdiction to have considered 
the immigration status issue.  In Director-General, Department of 
Community Services v M.,145 the Family Court of Australia was presented 
with the opportunity to consider the role of immigration status in the well-
settled determination.  The parents were married in Poland and their 
children were Polish citizens.146  Amid allegations that the father had 
abused the children, the mother sent both her son and daughter to live with 
her mother in Australia.147  Eventually, the mother divorced the father, and, 
upon establishing a more stable living situation, sent for the children from 
Australia.148  Her mother (the children’s grandmother), however, refused to 
return the children.149  Thereafter, the mother flew to Australia in an 
attempt to reestablish contact with the children.150  At the time Director 
General was decided, the grandmother had an order for interim residence of 
the children, while the mother had an order for interim contact.151  Upon the 
completion of the instant proceedings, the court would consider the pending 
residence application.152 
At the time the case was decided, the children held bridging visas that 
allowed them to remain in the country temporarily, pending the outcome of 
a petition for permanent residence filed by the grandmother.153  The court, 
in making its determination, recognized that in this case, the weight 
accorded to immigration status hinged on the outcome of the residence 
determination.154  Specifically, the court noted that should it find the 
grandmother to have parental responsibility for the children, it would be 
extremely unlikely for Australian authorities to then refuse the children’s 
 
 141. Id. para. 80. 
 142. Id. paras. 85–86. 
 143. Id. para. 87. 
 144. Id. para. 94. 
 145. (1998) 24 Fam LR 178 ¶ 91 (Austl.). 
 146. Id. para. 7.2. 
 147. Id. paras. 7.4–.5.  While the children were living in Australia, the grandmother’s 
husband sexually abused one of the children. Id. para. 7.6.  Interestingly, this abuse did not 
impact the grandmother’s judgment that the children were better off in Australia and, 
startlingly, does not appear to be addressed in the well-settled determination engaged in by 
the court. 
 148. Id. paras. 7.7–.8.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. para. 7.8. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. para. 74. 
 154. Id. para. 87. 
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application to remain in Australia.155  The court reasoned, however, that if 
it found that the children were not well-settled, it was likely that the 
Australian authorities would deny a residency application and require the 
children to leave the country.156 
The court was disinclined, however, to consider the child’s future 
prospects in its ultimate decision.157  Noting that future considerations 
should have no bearing on the determination, the court concluded that there 
is “no reason to find that the children will be required to leave Australia.”158  
Therefore, the court found that the children were likely settled at the 
relevant time.159 
A well-settled analysis, as seen in the other cases discussed in Part II.B, 
is usually singularly dispositive regarding the child’s ultimate living 
situation.  Thus, if a child is well-settled under Article 12, she is allowed to 
remain in the country.  On the other hand, if the child is not well-settled 
under Article 12, absent another defense or the court’s invocation of its 
Article 18 discretionary power, she is returned to her country of origin.  In 
Director General, the court hinged the well-settled analysis on the outcome 
of a future residency determination.  Therefore, though it appears the court 
intended to adopt a view that immigration status should play a limited role 
in the well-settled determination, it actually did just the opposite in granting 
immigration status particularly significant weight in the ultimate 
determination.160 
These cases have a number of factors in common.  First, each of the 
district courts in the decisions discussed above considered immigration 
status as a relevant factor in the well-settled determination.161  Second, each 
of the courts (aside from Director General which, as discussed above, is a 
unique case) found that the children were not well-settled.162  Third, all the 
cases discussed above reflect a forward-thinking approach that considers 
the child’s future prospects and how the threat of deportation or uncertain 
immigration status may impact the child’s ability to flourish in a new 
environment.163  The strongest common thread uniting these cases, 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Id. paras. 91–92. 
 158. Id. para. 92. 
 159. See id. para. 93. 
 160. See id. para. 87. 
 161. See Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Ahumada 
Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2004); In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 154 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 162. See Lopez, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Ahumada Cabrera, 323. F. Supp. 2d at 1314–
15; Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 154–55. 
 163. See Lopez, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 (“[T]heir residence in this country is not stable 
because neither [the mother] nor the children have legal alien status and, as such, are subject 
to deportation at anytime.”); Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (“[I]t is better for 
the child to return to Argentina now than for her to be deported at a later date when she has 
become firmly settled in the United States.”); Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (“The fact that the 
Immigration Service may not be looking to deport them at this time does not, in any way, 
guarantee that that position will not change in the future.”). 
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however, is the significant weight accorded to immigration status in the 
well-settled determination.  Though each of the courts considered 
immigration status as one of a number of factors, they each ultimately 
concluded that uncertain immigration status significantly outweighed other 
mitigating factors.164  Such an interpretation is one approach that has 
prevailed in the jurisprudence on this issue to date. 
B.  Immigration Status As an Equally Weighted Factor 
The next group of cases treats immigration status as one of a number of 
equally weighted factors in the well-settled determination.  In these cases, 
courts frequently find that though uncertain immigration status weighs 
against a well-settled finding, the totality of factors indicating that the child 
is well-settled may nonetheless allow for a well-settled finding.  In other 
instances, the court simply considers immigration status as one factor 
among many weighing for or against a well-settled determination. 
For example, in Giampaolo v. Erneta,165 a case from the Northern 
District of Georgia, a mother and child, both habitually resident in 
Argentina, fled to the United States.166  Eventually, the petitioner learned of 
the mother and child’s whereabouts and filed an application for return of the 
child with the Argentine Central Authority, but after the one-year period 
had lapsed.167 
Both the mother and child were in the United States illegally, although 
the mother stated, in asserting the Article 12 defense, that she had recently 
applied for citizenship.168  The court held that it was entitled to “consider 
any relevant factor surrounding the child’s living arrangement.”169  In doing 
so, the court considered the frequency with which the child and mother 
were forced to move within the United States, that the mother lacked any 
significant family support in the United States, and that the mother and 
child lacked citizenship status.170  Additionally, the court considered that 
the child had attended at least three different schools, that the child had 
developed significant ties to Argentina, and that the mother and child were 
currently living with the mother’s boyfriend—a convicted felon who had 
previously been charged with violating Georgia’s Family Violence Act.171  
These factors, when considered together, led to a finding that the child was 
not well-settled in the United States and so the court ordered that the child 
be returned to Argentina.172 
 
 164. Lopez, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1314; Koc, 
181 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
 165. 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
 166. Id. at 1274. 
 167. Id. at 1274–75. 
 168. Id. at 1282. 
 169. Id. at 1281 (citing Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1313).  
 170. Id. at 1282. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1282–83. 
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In Edoho v. Edoho,173 decided by the Southern District of Texas, the 
court took the same approach—considering immigration status as one of a 
number of equally weighted factors—and found that the children were well-
settled in their new environment.174  In Edoho, the mother and father were 
married in Nigeria but eventually moved to the Bahamas, where the father 
had citizenship.175  They had two children while living in the Bahamas, and 
the mother eventually fled with both children to her sister’s house in 
Houston, Texas.176  After some time, the father filed an application for 
assistance with the U.S. Department of State, requesting access to his 
children.177  In coordination with the Bahamian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
this request eventually morphed into an application for return of the 
children under the Convention.178  In the meantime, the mother had married 
a U.S. citizen and was in the process of applying for citizenship for both 
herself and her children.179 
The court, weighing a number of factors, found that the children were 
now well-settled in the United States.180  Specifically, the court considered 
the stability of their living situation, their success in school, and their 
participation in various activities.181  Interestingly, despite noting the 
uncertain immigration status of the mother and children earlier in the 
opinion, the court did not specifically list immigration status as a factor 
considered in its determination.182  This is due, perhaps, to the high 
likelihood that both the mother and children would obtain citizenship 
because the mother had married a U.S. citizen.183 
 
 173. No. H-10-1881, 2010 WL 3257480 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010). 
 174. See id. at *7. 
 175. Id. at *1. 
 176. Id.  The mother explained that she had fled the Bahamas because her husband had 
been abusive to her and the children.  Interestingly, she also alleged that one of her reasons 
for fleeing was that, since her immigration status in the Bahamas was based on her nursing 
job and her marriage, her husband had threatened to have her deported. Id. at *3. 
 177. Id. at *2.  In fact, the father waited nearly two years to file the application, despite 
having learned of the child’s whereabouts within one year of the abduction. Id. at *3.  The 
father explained that the delay was due to the great difficulty of finding a lawyer sufficiently 
versed in the Convention to accept his case. Id. The court found this argument unavailing. 
See id. 
 178. See id. at *2.  
 179. See id. at *4. 
 180. Id. at *7 (“And, the court finds that the children are ‘well-settled’ in their new 
home.”). 
 181. Id. at *6–7.  The court also conducted a fairly intensive tolling analysis in finding 
that the father’s delay in filing his petition could not be equitably tolled. Id. *7 Though the 
court did not explicitly state as much, it appears that the father’s lack of concern in obtaining 
the immediate return of his children also factored into the court’s well-settled determination. 
See id. (“[The mother] made no effort to conceal the children.  While she did not inform [the 
father] of her whereabouts, she went to live openly with a known relative, she did not change 
her name or the children’s names, and she enrolled [one of the children] in school. . . .  The 
efforts [the father] did take to find them could not be described as determined or diligent. . . .  
Additionally, the record reflects that his other efforts were equally desultory.”). 
 182. See id. at *6–7.  
 183. See id. at *4. 
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In Demaj v. Sakaj,184 decided by the District of Connecticut, a mother 
fled with her children from Italy to the United States.185  Nearly a year and 
a half later, the left-behind father filed a petition for return of the children 
pursuant to the Convention and ICARA.186  After filing the petition, the 
father visited the children in the United States and, after publicly 
threatening the mother, a warrant was issued for his arrest.187  Shortly 
thereafter, the mother applied for a U-Visa, which provides temporary 
immigration status to aliens who are victims of qualifying criminal 
activity.188  According to the mother, she and the children were able to 
obtain nonimmigrant status (specifically, legal permanent residence) in the 
United States, and the mother was further able to secure social security 
cards for herself and the children, employment authorization, and a 
Connecticut driver’s license.189 
Previously, the mother and father (who was temporarily living in the 
United States during the course of the proceedings in this case) agreed that 
all of the immigration documents belonging to the mother and children 
would remain with the mother’s counsel until the conclusion of the 
proceedings.190  The mother had accessed her passport in applying for the 
U-Visa, and the father argued that this access was in violation of the parties’ 
previous agreement.191  Further, he contended that the mother’s subsequent 
change in immigration status was directly relevant to her ability to establish 
the well-settled defense.192 
The court in Demaj was asked to decide a motion to compel production 
of documents relevant to the ultimate well-settled determination, and did 
not, therefore, decide the merits of whether the underlying defense was 
warranted.193  It did, however, engage in an in-depth discussion of whether 
immigration status is relevant to the well-settled determination.194  The 
court conducted a broad survey of how U.S. courts have approached the 
relevance of immigration status in determining whether a child is well-
settled.195  After considering cases like Ahumada, Koc, and Lozano v. 
Alvarez196 (the district court opinion), the court concluded that “[i]n the 
bulk of cases in which immigration status is considered [in a well-settled 
 
 184. No. 3:09 CV 255 (JGM), 2012 WL 476168 (D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2012). 
 185. See id. at *1. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at *2. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at *1. 
 191. See id. at *2. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. at *1. 
 194. See id. at *4–5. 
 195. See id. at *4 (listing cases). 
 196. In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Lozano v. 
Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-820 (U.S. Jan. 2, 
2013); see also Part II.C. 
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analysis] . . . it is considered as only one element among many.”197  The 
court also noted that in cases where immigration status was not considered, 
there was strong evidence of stability and numerous other factors weighing 
in favor of a well-settled finding.198 
The court granted particular deference to the district court’s decision in 
Lozano, which held that immigration status should only be a significant 
factor if there is an immediate and legitimate threat of deportation.199  Thus, 
the court rejected the forward-looking approach embraced by other courts in 
holding that, insofar as Article 12 is implicated, the Convention is 
concerned with the present.200 
Although they do not always come to the same conclusion, each of the 
courts in this section considers immigration status as one of a number of 
relatively equivalent factors in the well-settled determination.201  Even 
where the court found a return warranted, immigration status was only one 
of many factors weighing against a well-settled finding.202  This approach is 
closer to the approach that circuit courts, to date, have found to be the most 
appropriate:  granting immigration status relatively little weight in the well-
settled determination. 
C.  Immigration Status Granted Considerably Less Weight 
The last group of cases addressed by this Note exhibits the growing 
tendency of courts to accord immigration status little, if any, weight in the 
well-settled analysis.  In each of these cases, the court embraced a forward-
looking approach in determining that the child was either unlikely to be 
deported, or that the child’s prospects were not significantly negatively 
impacted by an uncertain immigration status.203  To date, both the Second 
and Ninth Circuits have considered the issue, with each finding that 
immigration status should play a minimal role in the well-settled 
 
 197. Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4. 
 198. See id. at *4 n.9.  The court recently decided the merits of the case and reaffirmed its 
earlier conclusion that immigration status is to be considered as one element among many in 
the Article 12 determination. Demaj v. Sakaj, No. 3:09 CV 255 (JGM), 2013 WL 1131418, 
at *23–24 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2013). 
 199. Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4 (citing Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 232–33). 
 200. See id.  The subsequent Demaj decision deviated slightly from this approach in light 
of the Second Circuit’s decision in Lozano.  Following the Second Circuit’s lead, the District 
of Connecticut considered how immigration status was likely to affect the benefits available 
to the children in the United States. See Demaj, 2013 WL 1131418, at *23. 
 201. See Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4; Edoho v. Edoho, No. H-10-1881, 2010 WL 
3257480, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010) (listing immigration status as one of a number of 
relevant factors in a “well-settled” determination); Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 
1269, 1281–82 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (same). 
 202. See, e.g., Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4. 
 203. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen making a now 
settled determination, courts need not give controlling weight to a child’s immigration 
status.”); In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that uncertain 
immigration status cannot undermine other considerations that weigh in favor of a “well-
settled” finding). 
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determination.204  International courts have also followed suit,205 although 
the reasoning embraced by each court differs on a case-by-case basis. 
1.  The Ninth Circuit 
In re B. Del C.S.B. is perhaps the most significant Article 12 immigration 
status decision to date and has formed the foundation for a host of district 
court decisions throughout the country.206  B. Del C.S.B. involved a mother 
and father who were both Mexican citizens.207  Neither had legal status in 
the United States, despite efforts by the mother’s mother to gain such 
status.208  During the duration of their relationship, the couple illegally 
moved back and forth between the United States and Mexico numerous 
times.209  Eventually, the mother, while living in Mexico, gave birth to a 
daughter.210  During the next few years, both parents illegally traveled back 
and forth between the United States and Mexico with their daughter in 
tow.211 
Eventually, the parents’ relationship soured, and the mother expressed a 
desire to permanently immigrate (illegally) to the United States with the 
daughter.212  The father agreed that the daughter could remain in the United 
States with the mother subject to a number of conditions—including the 
father being able to speak with the daughter on the telephone and to see her 
during school holidays.213  After some time, the mother severed all contact 
with the father.214  The father subsequently expended significant energy in 
pursuing a host of legal remedies to reestablish contact with his daughter.215  
Finally, the father was able to secure a meeting to initiate the Convention 
process; yet, he was forced to wait an additional seven months while his 
application was translated from Spanish to English.216  More than a year 
 
 204. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 45; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1010. Based on the greater 
authority accorded to circuit court decisions, and their likely impact on an eventual United 
States Supreme Court discussion of the issue, this Note discusses them below in significantly 
greater detail than the district court cases cited in Parts II.A and II.B. 
 205. See, e.g., C (a Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229, [55]–[57] (Eng.) (holding that a 
child is well-settled despite uncertain immigration status because the child is unlikely to be 
deported). 
 206. See, e.g., Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4; Edoho, 2010 WL 3257480, at *6. 
 207. B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1003. 
 208. Id. at 1003 n.4. 
 209. See id. at 1003. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. at 1004. 
 212. See id. at 1004–05. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. at 1005. 
 215. See id. at 1006.  These efforts included visiting the Mexican Office of Family 
Integration Services, and multiple trips to the Department of State for Protection of Minors.  
In doing so, the father was forced, on numerous occasions, to sleep outside of the building. 
See id. 
 216. Id. at 1006.  
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after his last contact with his daughter, the father submitted his application 
under the Convention to the Mexican Central Authority.217 
After receiving the application, the Mexican Central Authority “advised 
him not to take any further action, and to let the ‘long’ Convention process 
run its course.”218  The Mexican Central Authority then transmitted the 
father’s application to the U.S. Central Authority, which, in turn, 
transmitted it to the NCMEC.219  The NCMEC then forwarded a copy of 
the application to the Attorney General of California.220  Eventually, the 
NCMEC was able to obtain an address for the daughter in California, and 
the father subsequently filed his Convention petition in the Central District 
of California.221 
The district court granted the father’s petition based on, among other 
factors, the child’s uncertain immigration status in the United States.222  
Specifically, the court held that “[the mother] did not satisfy her burden of 
proving an Article 12 defense because [the daughter’s] unlawful 
immigration status precluded her from being settled in the United 
States.”223 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding, holding that 
uncertain immigration status does not undermine an otherwise well-settled 
determination.224  The court noted that this particular question was one of 
first impression:  May a court find that a child is not “settled” for purposes 
of Article 12 of the Convention because she does not have lawful 
immigration status?225 
The court, in addressing this question, engaged in an exhaustive analysis, 
beginning with a consideration of whether any factors weighed in favor of a 
well-settled finding.226  The court noted that the daughter had attended the 
same school for multiple grades, had consistently recorded strong report 
cards and attendance, was bilingual, and participated in multiple 
extracurricular activities.227  Additionally, the child had resided in 
California for some time, and her environment was otherwise relatively 
stable.228 
In determining how much weight to accord the mother and child’s 
uncertain immigration status, the court began by consulting the 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id.  It was believed, based on past information regarding the mother and daughter’s 
whereabouts, that both mother and daughter were living in California. See id. at 1006–07. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. at 1007. 
 223. Id. This decision reflects the rationale embraced by the courts discussed in Part II.A, 
wherein immigration status significantly undermined a well-settled finding. 
 224. See id. at 1015–16. 
 225. See id. at 1001–02. 
 226. Id. at 1009. 
 227. Id. at 1005–06. 
 228. Id. 
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Convention’s text and history.229  The court considered the definition of 
“habitual resident,” and determined that the term is to be interpreted 
broadly, with even unlawful or precarious residence possessing the ability 
to develop into habitual residence.230  The court applied the same reasoning 
to the term “settled,” noting that, lacking an explicit definition, “settled” 
may apply to a person who has been resident in a country for a significant 
amount of time, notwithstanding an uncertain immigration status.231  Thus, 
the court found that “[b]y acknowledging that an undocumented child may 
be habitually resident . . . we have already accepted the principle that a 
child may remain in a place in which he lacks legal status . . . because of his 
close ties to that country.”232  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
“[n]either text nor history suggests that lawful immigration status is a 
prerequisite, or even a factor of great significance, for a finding that a child 
is ‘settled’ in a new environment.”233 
Next, the court turned to case law in an attempt to gauge the appropriate 
role of immigration status in the well-settled determination.234  The court 
reasoned that “prior district court cases that have concluded that an 
undocumented child is not ‘settled’ have considered status as only one 
element among many pointing to a lack of significant ties to the United 
States.”235  In doing so, the court relied on the reasoning in C (a Child), a 
case from the United Kingdom.236  In that case, a British court granted little 
weight to the child’s uncertain immigration status in finding the child to be 
otherwise well-settled.237  The sole countervailing factor against a finding 
that the child was well-settled was the uncertain immigration status of the 
mother and child.238  Following C (a Child), the Ninth Circuit held that the 
child in the instant case “who has five years of stable residence in the 
United States, coupled with academic and interpersonal success here, may 
be ‘settled’ within the meaning of Article 12, despite her unlawful 
status.”239  Her uncertain immigration status, therefore, was not enough to 
overturn the determination that she was otherwise well-settled.240 
 
 229. See id. at 1010. 
 230. Id. at 1010–11. 
 231. Id.  The court noted, for example, that an undocumented infant that “knows no other 
home” is clearly settled in the new country, despite the infant’s lack of immigration status. 
Id. at 1011. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 1010. 
 234. See id. at 1010–11. 
 235. Id. at 1011. 
 236. Id. at 1012; see also infra notes 295–310 and accompanying text. 
 237. In justifying its reliance on C (a Child), the court noted that “in interpreting 
international treaties, ‘the opinions of our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable 
weight.’” B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 
(1985)). 
 238. See id. at 1011. 
 239. Id. at 1012.  The court also cited Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), noting that 
illegal entry into the country, does not, under traditional criteria, necessarily bar a person 
from becoming domiciled in a particular state. B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1010–11. 
 240. See id. at 1015–16. 
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The court then turned to a policy discussion to further cement its opinion 
that immigration status has a negligible impact on the well-settled 
determination.241  The court observed that many undocumented immigrants 
permanently live in the United States and never encounter any issues with 
the immigration authorities.242  These undocumented workers often obtain 
regular employment, the court noted, and have successfully established 
lives in the United States, irrespective of occasional heightened sensitivity 
toward illegal immigration.243  Further, the court stated that these specific 
parties were unlikely to be deported due to the large number of 
undocumented immigrants living in the United States, and the general 
preference for deporting illegal aliens with a criminal background.244 
The court in B. Del C.S.B. also conducted a detailed analysis of how 
immigration status might affect a child’s future prospects in California.245  
The court examined the benefits and protections that undocumented 
immigrants are frequently afforded under state and federal law.246  
Specifically, the court cited a recent California federal case holding that the 
state cannot deny public education to children based on immigration 
status;247 the California Education Code, which permits undocumented 
immigrants to pay in-state tuition fees at California universities and 
community colleges;248 and a recent article noting that undocumented 
immigrants are now eligible for Medicaid, school breakfast and lunch 
programs, and nutritional programs in the United States.249 
The court was careful, however, to measure these benefits and 
protections against the potential future issues that could arise from a child’s 
uncertain immigration status, including the inability to obtain a driver’s 
license, restricted access to college financial aid, poor employment 
prospects, and the general threat of deportation.250  Yet the court ultimately 
concluded that the Convention is concerned with the present, and any 
determination of future well-being is best left to the court conducting 
custody proceedings.251 
The court held, “We can see nothing in the Convention itself, in our case 
law, or in the practical reality of living in this country without documented 
 
 241. Id. at 1012 (“Third, we conclude that, on a practical level, it makes little sense to 
permit immigration status to serve as a determinative factor in the Article 12 ‘settled’ 
analysis.”). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See id. at 1012–13. 
 246. See id. at 1013. 
 247. See id. (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 
1255–56 (C.D. Cal. 1997)). 
 248. See id. (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5(a)(4) (West 2002)). 
 249. See id. (citing TANYA BRODER, OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL 
PROGRAMS 4.3 (2007)).  For an updated version of the report cited by the court, see TANYA 
BRODER & JONATHAN BLAZER, OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL 
PROGRAMS (2011), available at http://www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html. 
 250. See id. 
 251. Id. 
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status, to persuade us that immigration status should ordinarily play a 
significant, let alone dispositive, role in the ‘settled’ inquiry.”252  
Specifically, the court stated that the immigration status of the child and 
mother are only relevant if there is an immediate, “concrete threat of 
deportation.”253  The undocumented status of both mother and child cannot 
undermine all the other considerations that weigh in favor of a well-settled 
finding.254  The court summarized its holding as such: 
Where, as here, a child has lived and thrived in her home and school for 
over half of her life, and there is no reason to believe that she (or her 
undocumented parent) will suffer any imminent, negative consequences 
as a result of her unlawful status, it would be contrary to the Convention’s 
purpose of keeping a child in “the family and social environment in which 
its life has developed” to rely on immigration status as the basis for 
rejecting an Article 12 defense.255 
2.  The Second Circuit 
In Lozano, the Second Circuit followed suit in all respects except one key 
aspect of the determination.  Lozano concerned a mother and father, both 
originally from Colombia, who entered into a relationship in 2004 while 
they were living in London.256  Over the course of the relationship, Alvarez 
made various allegations of abuse against Lozano.257  Though they never 
married, the mother gave birth to a child in 2005, and the family lived 
together until 2008.258  During that time, the child developed a host of 
issues that may have been caused, to some degree, by the domestic disputes, 
including extreme shyness and bed-wetting.259  One day, instead of taking 
the child to nursery school, the mother fled with her daughter to a women’s 
shelter, where the two lived for approximately seven months.260  
Eventually, both mother and child fled to New York to live with the 
mother’s sister.261 
Since they had British passports, the mother and daughter were allowed 
to enter the United States without a visa for up to ninety days.262  In the 
months that followed, the child experienced dramatic behavioral 
improvements, was quite successful in school, and made several friends.263  
Meanwhile, the father had made a number of attempts to locate both the 
 
 252. Id. at 1010. 
 253. Id. at 1009. 
 254. Id. at 1010. 
 255. Id. at 1013. 
 256. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-
820 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. at 45–46. 
 259. Id. at 46. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See id. 
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mother and daughter within the United Kingdom.264  Eventually, the father 
filed an application for return of the child with the English and Welsh 
Central Authority, which then forwarded it to the U.S. Department of State 
Office of Children’s Issues.265  The father thereafter filed a petition for the 
return of the child in the Southern District of New York.266 
The district court held evidentiary hearings at which, among other things, 
it heard expert testimony regarding the child’s various behavioral issues and 
improvements since moving to the United States.267  The court first held 
that the father had made out a prima facie case of wrongful retention by 
establishing that (1) the child was a habitual resident in the United 
Kingdom; (2) the mother’s wrongful removal breached the father’s custody 
rights; and (3) the father was exercising those custody rights at the time the 
child was abducted.268  The district court ultimately denied the application, 
however, holding that the child was now well-settled in the United 
States.269  In doing so, the court considered a number of factors, including 
the duration of the child’s residence in the United States, her various social, 
behavioral and academic improvements, and the child’s family situation in 
New York.270  The court also considered the mother and child’s 
immigration status—specifically, that both had overstayed their visas and 
were residing in the United States illegally.271  The court explicitly rejected 
the argument that immigration status precludes a well-settled finding as a 
matter of law.272  Instead, the court adopted a forward-looking approach, 
noting that there was little to suggest that the child’s immigration status 
 
 264. See id. at 47.  The father contacted one of the mother’s other sisters residing in 
London, who denied any knowledge of the mother’s whereabouts. Id.  The father then filed 
an application with a British court to obtain regular contact with the child. Id.  He also 
submitted orders to the mother’s relatives and former counsel, as well as a number of other 
parties, including the child’s teachers and doctors, seeking information regarding the mother 
and child’s whereabouts. See id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Id. at 47–48. 
 269. Id. at 48.  The court also rejected the father’s argument that equitable tolling should 
apply so as to render any affirmative defenses moot. Id.  Specifically, the district court stated 
that the 
one-year period is not a statute of limitations and, therefore, it is not subject to 
equitable tolling.  A petitioner is not barred from bringing a petition after the one-
year period has lapsed; rather, after that point, a court must consider the 
countervailing consideration that the child may now be better served remaining 
where he or she is currently located. 
In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Lozano v. Alvarez, 
697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-820 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013). 
 270. Lozano, 809 F Supp. 2d at 231, 234. 
 271. See id. at 233.  The mother indicated during the hearing that she had spoken with 
immigration authorities about the possibility of being sponsored by her sister. Lozano, 697 
F.3d at 46. 
 272. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 232–33. 
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would, now or in the future, significantly affect the stability of the child’s 
life in New York.273 
The father subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal274 and, prior to 
oral argument, the Second Circuit requested that the U.S. Government 
submit an amicus brief.275  Specifically, the court asked the government to 
address the equitable tolling issue, as well as the proper degree of weight to 
be accorded to immigration status when determining whether a child is 
settled within the meaning of Article 12.276  The government thereafter 
submitted a letter brief recommending that the court consider the child’s 
immigration status as one factor in the court’s determination of whether the 
child was now settled in her new environment.277  The government, in 
arguing for a reduced role for immigration status in the determination, 
relied on many of the cases discussed in this Note, including a number of 
international decisions.278  The government did, however, advocate for a 
forward-looking approach in determining how much weight should 
ultimately be accorded to immigration status in the determination.279 
In rendering its decision, the Second Circuit addressed two questions of 
first impression:  Should the one-year period be equitably tolled, and can a 
child who lacks legal immigration status nevertheless be found to be well-
settled under Article 12.280  As to the latter issue, the court began its 
analysis with the text of the Convention, noting the great degree of weight 
accorded to the statutory language and legislative history.281  In considering 
 
 273. Id. at 233.  The district court also considered whether it should exercise its 
discretionary power, under Article 18, to order return of the child despite the existence of a 
valid affirmative defense. See id. at 234–35.  In declining to do so, the court focused on the 
fact that the child had experienced dramatic social and behavioral improvement since 
moving to the United States, and ordering a return of the child to the United Kingdom risked 
exposing the child to additional trauma. Id.  The court, in employing this reasoning, 
essentially asserted a sua sponte “grave risk” affirmative defense. See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 274. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 49. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Letter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-2224-cv).  The government also recommended that the court 
find that “[e]quitable tolling does not apply to the one-year period under Article 12; instead, 
the court retains equitable discretion to order a child’s return at any time.” Id. 
 278. See id. at 13–15 (citing A. v. M. (2002), 209 N.S.R. 2d 248 (Can. N.S. C.A.); C (a 
Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229 (Eng.)). 
 279. See id. (noting that each situation must be considered on a case-by-case basis and the 
likelihood of deportation in the future may impact the “well-settled” determination).  The 
government also stated that “[t]he Convention’s overarching focus on a child’s well-being 
suggests that this [well-settled] inquiry concerns a child’s practical circumstances.” Id. 
 280. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 45.  On the tolling issue, the court considered the Convention’s 
plain language, history, the government’s arguments in its amicus brief, and other relevant 
circuit court decisions.  The court concluded that the one-year period was not subject to 
equitable tolling, and therefore the mother in Lozano was free to assert the Article 12 
affirmative defense. See id. at 50–55. 
 281. Id. at 56–57.  The court specifically stated, earlier in the decision, that any treaty 
analysis begins with a close examination of the text and history of the treaty and that, while 
general rules of statutory construction may be considered, the court must look to the history 
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how to define “settled,” the court stated that, “[w]here a term is undefined 
in a statute, ‘we normally construe it . . . with its ordinary or natural 
meaning.’”282  In this case, the court determined that “settled,” as it is used 
in the statute, suggests a “stable and permanent relocation of the child.”283  
This term is informed by the statute as a whole; despite the Convention’s 
goals to ensure a prompt return of the child, the drafters recognized that 
there may come a point where returning the child to her habitual residence 
would not be in the child’s best interests.284  Thus, the court concluded that 
the child is settled where she has developed “significant emotional and 
physical connections demonstrating security, stability, and permanence in 
[her] new environment.”285 
In making a well-settled determination, the court recognized (as have 
many courts that have considered the issue) that it may consider any 
potentially relevant factor, including a child’s immigration status.286  The 
court, however, determined that the weight accorded to immigration status 
will inevitably vary for a number of reasons, including the likelihood that 
the child will be able to obtain legal resident status in the United States, the 
child’s age, and the extent to which the child’s future prospects will be 
impinged by her uncertain status.287  Yet the court ultimately recognized, in 
endorsing the district court’s decision, that this uncertainty must be weighed 
against a number of other factors suggesting the child is well-settled.288  In 
doing so, the court concluded that courts need not give significant weight to 
a child’s immigration status when making an Article 12 determination.289  
On a case-by-case basis, the weight accorded to immigration status—
insofar as it relates to a child’s future prospects—will vary depending on, 
for example, the likelihood of deportation or the existence of significant 
barriers to the child’s obtaining government benefits.290  Yet the Second 
Circuit, following the general reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in B. Del 
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C.S.B., ultimately opted to adopt an approach in which immigration status is 
accorded relatively minimal weight in the well-settled determination.291  
The court declined, however, “to impose a categorical rule that the weight 
to be given to a child’s immigration status var[y] only in accordance with 
the threat of deportation.”292  The left-behind father has filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. 293  The Court has not yet addressed 
the petition, but has requested that the Solicitor General provide advice in 
the case. 294 
3.  The United Kingdom 
International courts have adopted similar interpretations regarding the 
role of immigration status in the well-settled determination.  C (a Child),295 
a British case, presents just such a scenario.  In C (a Child), a mother and 
daughter fled from the United States to England amidst allegations that the 
father had sexually abused another one of his daughters.296  The mother had 
recently remarried a man living in England.297  Shortly thereafter, the father 
obtained a warrant for the mother’s arrest for violation of a contact order 
between the father and daughter, and the U.S. court granted the father 
custody of the child.298  Nearly five years later, the father was able to locate 
the mother and child in England, and subsequently filed a petition for return 
of the child.299  At the time, the child had been going to school in England 
for a number of years and had many British friends.300  The mother and 
daughter, however, were still residing in England illegally.301 
In conducting a well-settled Article 12 analysis, the British High Court of 
Justice, Family Division, considered a two-prong test with both physical 
and emotional/psychological components.302  The court noted that, as to the 
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first prong, the child was indeed settled in England—she was well-
integrated into the community, had been living in the same place for some 
time, and had made a number of permanent relationships.303  The court 
recognized that the key question concerned the stability inherent in the 
second prong:  “So far as the future is concerned, the only question mark 
hanging over the continued residence of [the daughter] and her mother 
where they presently are, is their immigration status.”304  In evaluating how 
much weight to accord immigration status, the court stated that there must 
be a showing of stability into the future such that the child’s “position . . . 
[is] as permanent as anything in life can be said to be permanent.”305 
The court concluded that despite an ongoing risk of deportation, the 
mother and daughter had been given no warning or notice that they were 
likely to be deported.306  Additionally, the mother’s application for leave to 
remain was still pending.307  The court noted that there was a strong 
likelihood that the immigration authorities were aware of the mother and 
daughter’s presence in England and had opted not to deport them.308  
Therefore, the court reasoned, it was unlikely that deportation would occur 
in the future, and thus the mother and daughter’s uncertain immigration 
status should be granted minimal weight.309  The court ultimately found that 
the child was well-settled in England and declined to issue a return order.310 
The aforementioned cases each come to the conclusion that immigration 
status should play a relatively minor role in the well-settled 
determination.311  Whether based on close scrutiny of the Convention and 
its history,312 decisions of other courts,313 or practical considerations,314 the 
Second and Ninth Circuits and the British High Court of Justice, Family 
Division, each recognized that, though the mother and child in each case 
lacked legal immigration status, other factors dwarfed any concerns 
regarding immigration uncertainty.315  Each found that there was relatively 
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little evidence suggesting that the child faced a threat of deportation.316  In 
addition, both the Second and Ninth Circuits suggested that the child’s 
immigration status would likely have little effect on the child’s future 
prospects—a forward-looking approach that was not preclusive of a well-
settled finding.317 
III.  FINDING A COMPROMISE:  MANY OPINIONS, 
TWO CIRCUITS, ONE APPROACH 
Each of the approaches discussed in Part II—granting immigration status 
considerable weight, relatively equal weight, or relatively little weight in 
the well-settled determination—presents a compelling case for how 
immigration status should be analyzed in an Article 12 case.  Indeed, it 
might seem logical that uncertain immigration status should virtually 
preclude a well-settled determination, as the courts in Part II.A contend.  
How can a child ever be truly settled if she faces at least a theoretical threat 
of deportation?  Yet the courts in Part II.C, after engaging in a detailed 
analysis of the Convention’s history and purpose, case law, and practical 
considerations, came to the opposite conclusion:  immigration status should 
play a relatively minor role in the determination, and likely will not (at least 
in B. Del C.S.B. and Lozano) have significant effects on the child’s future 
prospects. 
It is clear that courts across the country—indeed, across the world—are 
split on how to approach this nuanced and important issue.  Part III 
discusses a potential compromise, and advocates for a uniform approach to 
the issue that ultimately accords immigration status relatively minor 
consideration, but still retains a forward-looking evaluation of its impact on 
the child’s future.  Specifically, this approach would adopt the findings of 
the Second and Ninth Circuits insofar as they advocate for relatively 
minimal weight to be accorded to immigration status in an Article 12 
determination.  Yet, as the Second Circuit recognized in Lozano, the degree 
to which immigration status should factor into the Article 12 analysis 
ultimately hinges on the protections available, on a case-by-case basis, to 
ensure that a child has the opportunity to fully prosper in a new 
environment. 
A.  The First Prong:  Immigration Status Should Be 
Accorded Minimal Weight 
The first rule embraced by this approach dictates that courts grant 
immigration status minimal weight in the well-settled determination.  The 
Ninth Circuit, in particular, conducts an exhaustive analysis of why this 
should be the case,318 and the Second Circuit essentially adopts such an 
 
 316. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 58; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1012; C (a Child), [2006] 
EWHC (Fam) [57]. 
 317. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 57–58; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013. 
 318. See supra notes 229–55 and accompanying text. 
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approach, but does so with more brevity.319  Beginning with the 
Convention’s text and history, the Ninth Circuit makes the argument that 
the Convention drafters did not intend for immigration status to play a 
particularly significant role in the well-settled determination.320  Relying on 
the ambiguity of the “settled” definition, as well as the Convention’s 
overtones stressing the best interests of the child, both circuits determined 
that a statutory analysis leads to a conclusion that immigration status should 
be considered as at least an equally weighted factor, if not an insignificant 
one.321 
Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments for granting immigration 
status little weight in the well-settled determination is that undocumented 
immigrants, specifically those living peacefully in the United States, face a 
relatively low risk of deportation.322  As the Ninth Circuit makes clear, 
millions of undocumented immigrants live their entire lives in the United 
States without ever encountering a problem with the immigration 
authorities.323  The court in C (a Child) came to a similar conclusion (albeit 
from a slightly different angle).  Where the immigration authorities knew of 
the parent and child’s illegal status and still opted not to take action, the 
court was free to conclude that it was unlikely that the parent and child 
would face deportation.324 
Indeed, perhaps the strongest argument in favor of such an approach has 
not been explicitly articulated by the courts discussed above, but is 
essentially inherent in their discussion of the well-settled factors:  that, at 
the time of consideration, immigration status had not prevented the child 
from developing significant connections and succeeding in a new 
environment.  Despite an uncertain immigration status, the daughter in B. 
Del C.S.B. had attended the same school for multiple years, had consistently 
strong report cards and regular attendance, and excelled in various 
extracurricular activities.325  In Lozano, the child had made dramatic 
behavioral advancements, made a number of new friends, and was doing 
well in school.326  Even in those cases that ultimately grant immigration 
status a dispositive role in the well-settled determination, courts do not 
hesitate to describe the significant advances the children have made in their 
new environment.327  Perhaps the best evidence that immigration status 
should be granted minimal weight in the determination, therefore, is that it 
has, in case after case, presented virtually no hindrance to the child’s ability 
to excel in a new environment.328 
 
 319. See supra notes 281–91 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra notes 229–33, 281–91 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 307–10 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 327. See, e.g., supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 328. See, e.g., supra notes 181, 227–28, 263 and accompanying text. 
 2013] ACROSS THE BORDER AND BACK AGAIN 3727 
B.  The Second Prong:  A Forward-Looking, Case-by-Case Approach 
Despite the various arguments discussed above, it is possible to imagine 
a situation in which, though the child has suffered no ill effects to date 
because of her uncertain immigration status and does not face any 
immediate threat of deportation, the child is significantly disadvantaged in 
the future because of her immigration status.329  Obviously, such a forward-
looking approach assumes a number of things—including, for example, that 
the child is unable to obtain legal status in the interim.  Consideration of 
these potential disadvantages, however, is consistent with the Convention’s 
goals of protecting the child’s best interests.  Therefore, the second aspect 
of the approach advocated in this Note mandates that courts generally 
accord immigration status little weight, except where that uncertain 
immigration status is likely to affect the child’s future prospects, 
irrespective of a deportation risk. 
The Ninth Circuit presented a logical template of how to conduct such an 
analysis in B. Del C.S.B., where it specifically discussed how immigration 
status may impact a child’s future prospects.330  The court noted that the 
child faced significant barriers in obtaining a driver’s license and access to 
college financial aid.331  It also considered, however, the various 
protections implemented under state and federal law to allow 
undocumented immigrants to flourish in the United States.332  Specifically, 
the court noted California educational codes permitting undocumented 
immigrants to pay reduced fees for state universities, and recent trends 
across the country broadening access to Medicaid, state nutritional 
programs, and subsidies for school lunches.333  The court ultimately 
concluded, however, that the settled inquiry is purely concerned with the 
present.334 
Thus, though the Ninth Circuit recognized the potential value of 
considering the child’s future prospects, it declined to ultimately consider 
how they might be impacted by the child’s uncertain immigration status in 
conducting a well-settled analysis.  The Second Circuit, though highly 
deferential to the Ninth Circuit’s findings, declined to adopt this particular 
aspect of the Ninth Circuit decision and opted instead to suggest an 
approach more in line with that suggested by this Note.  The Second Circuit 
asserted that the weight ascribed to a child’s immigration status will 
necessarily vary on a case-by-case basis 
because we can imagine instances where immigration status may be 
important even if the threat of removal is negligible, we decline to impose 
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a categorical rule that the weight to be given a child’s immigration status 
varies only in accordance with the threat of deportation.335 
The Second Circuit recognized that whether the child will be precluded 
from receiving government benefits, for example, may weigh on the 
immigration decision, despite a finding that the child was not facing a 
significant deportation risk.336 
As the U.S. government notes in its amicus brief in Lozano, “[t]he 
Convention’s overarching focus on a child’s well-being suggests that this 
[well-settled] inquiry concerns a child’s practical circumstances.”337  A 
forward-looking approach that grants additional weight to immigration 
status where it appears likely that it will significantly impact the child’s 
ability to flourish in their new country is consistent with the purpose of the 
Convention. 
Thus, consider two scenarios under the approach proposed by this Note:  
In the first, the child faces little deportation risk and state and federal 
protections exist guaranteeing undocumented immigrants significant rights 
to education, medical care, and the like.  In the second, the child again faces 
little deportation risk, but there are few, if any, state and federal protections 
in place to protect the rights of undocumented immigrants.  Therefore, in 
the second scenario, it appears likely that the child will be unable to access 
the same rights as those guaranteed to them in their country of origin.  
Under the approach outlined in this Note, a court considering how 
immigration status affects a well-settled determination would grant 
immigration status significantly more weight in the second scenario.  
Therefore, immigration status, by default, plays a relatively minimal role in 
the Article 12 analysis, except where it is likely to affect the child’s future 
prospects. 
CONCLUSION 
The role immigration status plays in the Article 12 determination 
ultimately has a major and tangible effect on the life of the child in 
question.  The issue addressed by this Note is not a theoretical procedural 
scenario or an arcane aspect of an obscure area of law, but a significant 
debate with far-reaching consequences.  Whether or not to order the return 
of a child—where that could mean a return to a potentially abusive parent 
or an unsettled environment—is no small charge.  Yet for the most part, 
courts have heeded the Convention’s purpose:  protecting the best interests 
of the child.  The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to an Article 12 
case to promulgate a bright-line rule, such as the one suggested by this 
Note.  Such a rule would preserve the Convention’s mandate by reflecting 
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an overarching concern for the child’s welfare, both at the time of the well-
settled determination and into the future. 
